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Abstract
Finnish unemployment rose in the early 1990s from 3% to 18% in just four years.
It has since fallen back to the average European level, being 9.0% in January
2003. In this paper, we describe the shocks leading to this unforeseen increase in
unemployment. We then discuss and research the role of labour market
institutions in the adjustment process that has brought unemployment back to a
‘normal’ level. We argue that these institutions cannot be blamed for the increase
in unemployment, but that more flexible institutions could have led to a more
rapid fall in unemployment once the Finnish economy began to recover.
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Tiivistelmä
Suomen työttömyys kasvoi 1990 luvun alkupuolella 3 prosentista 18 prosenttiin
neljässä vuodessa. Sen jälkeen työttömyys on vähentynyt keskimääräiselle
eurooppalaiselle tasolle ja oli 9 % tammikuussa 2003. Tässä keskustelualoitteessa
kuvataan sokkeja, jotka johtivat tähän huimaan työttömyyden kasvuun. Sen jäl-
keen pohditaan ja tutkitaan työmarkkinainstituutioiden roolia sopeutumis-
prosessissa, joka on palauttanut työttömyyden eurooppalaisen keskitasolle. Työssä
päädytään siihen, että työmarkkinainstituutioita ei voi syyttää työttömyyden kas-
vusta 1990 luvun alussa, mutta että joustavammat työmarkkinainstituutiot olisivat
voineet johtaa nopeampaan työttömyyden vähenemiseen Suomen talouden alkaes-
sa elpyä.
Avainsanat: talouskriisi, työmarkkinainstituutiot, työttömyys
JEL-luokittelu: E32, J51, J645
Contents
Abstract....................................................................................................................3
Tiivistelmä (Abstract in Finnish).............................................................................4
1 Overview ...........................................................................................................7
2 Economic crisis in the early 1990s..................................................................9
2.1 The 1980’s boom.......................................................................................9
2.2 Big negative shocks.................................................................................10
2.3 Resumed growth......................................................................................11
3 Structural changes after recession................................................................12
4 Labour market institutions ...........................................................................15
4.1 Labour market institutions and unemployment.......................................15
4.2 Unemployment benefits and unemployment...........................................16
4.2.1 The current benefit system...........................................................16
4.2.2 Evidence on the employment effects of unemployment
benefits.........................................................................................17
4.3 Unions and wage formation.....................................................................21
4.4 Active labour market policies..................................................................24




Development in Finnish unemployment during the past twenty years is an
exceptional episode in the modern economic history. For most of the 1980s, the
unemployment rates were around five percent, similar to the other Scandinavian
countries, but much lower than in the continental Europe. In just four years,
beginning in 1991, the unemployment rate hiked to close to twenty percent.
Increases of this magnitude within such a short period had not occurred in the
OECD countries after the Second World War.
The recovery was almost equally remarkable. The average growth rate of the
Finnish economy during the period 1994–2001 was 3.3, the second highest in the
EU countries after Ireland. Despite the fast growth, the unemployment rate has
remained high when compared to the pre-recession level. The latest figures at the
time of writing of this report show that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
was 9.0% in January 2003.
The Finnish economy experienced several adverse economic shocks in the
early 1990’s. These shocks were partly unavoidable developments in the
international economy, such as the collapse of exports to the Soviet Union, the fall
in the terms of trade, and the rise in the interest rates in Europe after the German
unification. Domestic economic policies also contributed to the adverse
development. Real interest rose to close to 15% and real asset prices fell creating
problems first to the highly indebted private sector firms, and, eventually, to the
banking sector. Due to adverse macroeconomic shocks job destruction was rapid
during the first years in the 1990’s. The inflow to unemployment rose by 60%
compared to the pre-recession level.
The recession in the 1990’s was also associated with a rapid re-structuring of
the economy. The recovery in the sectors with largest declines in employment
during the recession was slow compared with the rapid growth in some new
service sectors. This created a large mismatch problem in the labour market. As
we will argue later on, the labour market institutions cannot be blamed for the
decline in employment in the early 1990’s, but some institutional features,
particularly the unemployment benefit system, clearly slowed the adjustment by
lessening the incentives for regional and occupational mobility. This is also
reflected in the large increase in the duration of unemployment during the 1990’s.
It is perhaps most informative to start with a picture that puts the Finnish
unemployment in perspective by comparing the Finnish unemployment rates to
the EU average. It is also natural to compare the Finnish experience to the
Swedish one, as the two neighbouring countries have rather similar labour market
institutions and faced partly similar shocks.8




































































































Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators. Before 1988
EU-12 from OECD Employment Outlook.
Figure 1 presents the seasonally adjusted standardized unemployment rates in
Finland, Sweden and EU-15 since 1980. The figure shows that the Finnish (and
Swedish) unemployment rates were much below European average for most of
the 1980s. The low unemployment rate in Scandinavian countries was often cited
as evidence on the success of the Scandinavian model with corporatist wage-
setting. For example, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) argue that coordinated
bargaining moderates wage growth and decreases unemployment by internalising
the employment effects of wage bargains. But as seen in Figure 1 the
Scandinavian model appears to have worked less well during the 1990s.
Unemployment rates increased rapidly in both Finland and Sweden, and followed
very similar time pattern in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Finland,
unemployment rate started to increase in 1991, reached the peak of 18% in 1994,
and then began a rapid decline that lasted until 2001.
In this article we provide a detailed description of the events, and come up
with some explanations for the exceptional development. The rest of the article is
organized as follows. We start in section 2 by describing the macroeconomic
development leading to the crisis in the early 1990s. This is followed in section 3
by an analysis of the structural changes during, and perhaps, because of the
recession. The latter part of the paper is more micro-oriented, looking first, in
section 4, at the effects of various labour market institutions on the level of
unemployment. In section 5, we examine the changes in the duration of
unemployment. Finally, section 6 summarizes our findings.9
2 Economic crisis in the early 1990s
The record high increase in unemployment in the early 1990’s was caused by
large macroeconomic shocks, both international and domestic. The roots of the
1990’s crisis can be traced to the overheating period in the late 1980’s, so we first
characterize the changes that occurred in the late 1980’s.
2.1 The 1980’s boom
1
In the first half of the 1980’s the performance of the Finnish economy, measured
in terms of economic growth, was relatively smooth with an average growth rate
slightly above the OECD-European rate. This smooth development changed
around 1986–1987. Growth accelerated significantly and the economy entered a
period of overheating. The rate of unemployment declined from the
approximately 4 percent of the first half of the decade to about 2.5–3 percent at
the end of 1989. Several factors were behind this change. Without trying to
quantify their relative significance, these can be classified into the following
categories: (i) Financial market deregulation, including both the abolition of
regulation of domestic bank lending rates and the lifting of restrictions on private
borrowing from abroad, led to an explosion of bank credit and large capital
inflows. (ii) A sharp increase in the terms of trade as a result of the fall in energy
prices and the rise in world market prices of forest products. (iii) Fiscal policy did
not appear to counteract the fast growth. On the contrary, public consumption and
investment contributed positively to it.
The process of financial deregulation in the second half of the 1980s, was
problematic in several respects. First, its timing coincided with the upswing of the
business cycle. Second, rules and practices in prudential regulation and bank
supervision were left unchanged. Third, the tax system, which had favored debt
financing of investments, was not reformed. Finally, monetary policy tried to
maintain some tightness in the wake of the boom, which increased both the real
and nominal interest rates. In the late 1980s, nominal interest rates were on
average 6 per cent higher in Finland than eg in Germany. This, and the investors’
belief in the fixed exchange rate, contributed to the capital inflow in foreign
currency terms.
                                                
1 See Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) for a detailed description of the overheating and the onset of
the crisis.10
2.2 Big negative shocks
The end of the boom came in 1990, when a rapid process towards bust started.
Economic activity, as measured by the growth rate of the real GDP, declined
extremely rapidly from a positive growth of 5.4% in 1989 to a negative growth of
6.5% in 1991. Thereafter, the decline continued, though at a slower pace through
1992 and most of 1993. While all domestic components of the aggregate demand
contributed to the decline in economic activity, a particularly important feature
was the major decline in investment activity. Also price inflation slowed down
significantly. The emergence of a major banking crisis was a notable feature of
the bust process. Rapidly falling asset prices (see Figure 2) and bankruptcies of
firms led to credit losses, and the government had to provide public support for
banks. The banking crisis was an episode of major financial restraint. Financial
factors strongly accentuated both the rise and the fall in the aggregate demand.
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Both international and domestic factors contributed to the onset of the crisis.
These factors can be classified into ‘bad luck and bad policies’. First, the Finnish
exports to the market economies declined as a result of slow international growth,
loss in the price competitiveness of the Finnish industry, and the fall in the terms
of trade. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Finnish exports and imports to
Russia dropped in 1991 by 70 percent almost overnight. Second, the German
unification raised the interest rates in Europe as a result of loose fiscal and tight
monetary policies in Germany. Higher interest rate caused a big negative shock to
the highly indebted private sector. Third, monetary policy turned very restrictive
in early 1989 after the revaluation of the Finnish markka. The defense of the11
markka against speculative attacks increased nominal interest rates, and when the
inflation rate decreased at the beginning of the recession, the real interest rate
increased dramatically. (See Figure 3) The fixed exchange rate was eventually
abandoned with the devaluation of the Finnish markka in November 1991 and its
floating in September 1992. Depreciation of the currency improved the price
competitiveness of the export sector but the companies that had large debts in
foreign currency suffered large losses.
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2.3 Resumed growth
The Finnish economy turned around in late 1993. Initially this recovery was
mostly concentrated in the export industries that benefited from the depreciation
of the Finnish markka. Notwithstanding rapid growth during the period 1994–
2001 – 3.3% and the second highest in the EU countries after Ireland – inflation
has remained low and external competitiveness has increased rapidly (see
Figure 4).12
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The low inflation and strong external competitiveness have been the result of two
things: First, the European new architecture of inflation targeting has changed the
relationship between economic growth and inflation. Second, the centralized wage
bargaining, prevailing in most years, has moderated wage formation and, thereby,
contributed to higher competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Moreover, in
Spring 1995 a new government was formed and from the start it formulated a
program of fiscal consolidation that covered its term in office.
All in all, improved monetary credibility in the form of inflation targeting, the
dominance of centralized bargaining and the systematic program of fiscal
consolidation clearly played a role in the turnaround and resumption of economic
growth in Finland in the mid-1990’s.
3 Structural changes after recession
During just four years of the economic crisis, 450 000 jobs were destroyed. Total
employment declined by 18 percent from its 1990 level. In the first quarter of
1994, employment was slightly below 2 million, at its lowest level since 1949.
After 1994, employment has grown steadily, by approximately 2 percentage
points each year. By 2001, total employment has grown by 313 000, or by about
two thirds of the decline in the early 1990s.
During the recession some sectors suffered much more than others.
Construction industry was hit particularly hard; half of the jobs in construction
disappeared between 1990 and 1994. Employment declined by approximately
25% also in manufacturing, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and financial13
services. Figure 5 shows the contribution of different sectors to the total decline in
employment.
Total employment increased rapidly during the recovery after 1994. The
largest increases in employment occurred in the business services and in the
manufacturing of equipment. The electronics industry was responsible for most of
the growth in manufacturing; other manufacturing sectors experienced only
modest employment increases. The service sector, particularly business services,
education and social services, grew rapidly. After 1994, employment declined
substantially only in agriculture and financial intermediation. Decline in the
agriculture continues a long trend that had begun already in the 1960s. Decline in
the financial intermediation is mostly due to the restructuring of the banking
sector after the financial crisis.
As Figure 5 indicates, the newly created jobs were rather different from the
jobs lost in the early 1990s. The most rapidly growing service sectors had only
experienced small employment declines during the recession. Of the sectors that
experienced large job losses during the recession, employment returned close to
the pre-recession level only in the manufacturing of equipment. Less than a half of
the employment decline in construction, and only a third of the employment
decline in retail trade, was matched by subsequent employment growth after 1994.
The rapid structural change in employment created an increasing mismatch
problem in the labour market. Unemployed ex-construction workers were poorly
equipped to find jobs in the growing service sector. Since skill-requirements were
often higher than the education level of the unemployed, the differences in
unemployment rates across groups with different levels of education grew rapidly.
The unemployment rate for those with only compulsory education exceeded 20
percent while the unemployment rate for those with university education remained
around 3–4 percent. Uneven regional development also contributed to the
mismatch problem. After the recession the employment growth was rapid in the
capital region and Southern Finland, and much slower in the high unemployment
regions in Northern and Eastern Finland.14
Figure 5. Change in employment by industry during the
recession and recovery
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the Labour Force Survey. Industry
classification according to ISIC 2-3 digit classification as used in the LFS.
The clearest indication of growing mismatch is the Beveridge-curve that shows
the relationship between the unemployment rate and open vacancies in the
employment offices. Figure 6 describes the Beveridge-curve for the period 1971-
2001. It shows how most of the variation in the unemployment rate is related to
business cycle (movements along the curve in north-west – south-east direction).
However, the curve has also clearly moved out. Eyeball econometrics reveals two
clear outward shifts in the curve. The first occurred in late 1970s and the other
much larger shift in the early 1990s. By the year 2000, the vacancy rate is back to
its level in 1988, but the unemployment rate is about six percentage points higher.15
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4 Labour market institutions
4.1 Labour market institutions and unemployment
It has often been suggested that the low unemployment rate in the US is due to
dynamic and flexible job markets, while the high European unemployment results
from rigid and inflexible markets. An important issue is then to ask: which
features of labour markets do generate unemployment and which do not matter?
Nickell (1997) classifies labour market institutions into the following
categories: (i) employment protection and labour standards, (ii) benefit
replacement ratio and benefit duration, (iii) active labour market policies, (iv)
union density and coverage of bargaining agreements, (v) co-ordination of wage
bargaining, and (vi) the tax wedge. In our working paper (Koskela and Uusitalo,
2003) we examine these institutions in detail. However, many institutional
features are rather similar in Finland than in many other European countries. For
example, taxes or job protection may have something to do with unemployment,
but the effects are likely to be similar than in many other European countries. We
have little to add to the discussion on the effects of these institutions, and refer the
reader to the article by Nickell (2002) in this book. Here we concentrate on the
institutions that differ from the other European countries and which we believe are
most important for the Finnish case. Therefore, we start with a description of the16
unemployment benefits, continue by discussing wage bargaining system, and
conclude with some remarks on the active labour market polices.
4.2 Unemployment benefits and unemployment
4.2.1 The current benefit system
Unemployment benefits system in Finland consists of labour market subsidies and
unemployment allowances. Unemployment allowance can be further classified to
the basic allowance paid by the state through the Social Insurance Institution (UA)
and the earnings related allowance paid by the unemployment funds (UI).
In order to qualify for an unemployment allowance the unemployed must
have been employed for 43 weeks during the past two years. Earnings-related
allowance also requires that the unemployed worker has been a member of an
unemployment insurance fund for 10 months prior to unemployment.
Unemployment allowance can be received for 500 days. An exception is
made for the unemployed who turn 57 before the benefits expire. These
unemployed are entitled for an extension of benefits until the age of 60. The age
limit for the benefit extension was 55 up to 1997 and will be raised to 59 in 2005.
The extended duration of unemployment benefits for the older workers is
popularly known as unemployment pension tunnel. The unemployed who lose
their jobs after age of 55 can receive unemployment and unemployment pension
benefits up to the retirement age. These unemployed have minimal incentives to
search for work, and, consequently, a job loss after age of 55 most often leads to a
permanent exit from the labour market (Hakola and Uusitalo, 2001).
Those unemployed who do not meet the employment condition, or who have
already received unemployment allowance for 500 days, can receive a labour
market subsidy from the state. The labour market subsidy is paid, subject to the
means test, for an unlimited period. Both the labour market subsidy and the basic
allowance are currently 23 euro per day (2003). Dependent children increase the
benefits. The earnings-related unemployment allowance consists of a basic
amount equal to the basic allowance, and of an earnings-related part, which is
45% of the difference between previous daily earnings and the basic allowance.
There is no ceiling on the unemployment benefits, but the earnings exceeding
2072 euro per month increase the allowance by only 20% of the exceeding
amount. In practice, this implies that, for the median income earner (2142
e/month), the gross replacement rate is 55%. Since benefits increase by only a17
fraction of the previous earnings, replacement rate decreases with earnings. For
someone earning twice the median income, the gross replacement rate is 38%.
2
Unemployment benefits are taxable income just as wages and salaries. Due to
the progressive taxation net replacement rates are higher than gross replacement
rates. Accounting for the effect of the income taxes increases the replacement rate
for the median earner from 55% to 64%. Other earnings-related benefits such as
housing allowance further increase net replacement rates.
4.2.2 Evidence on the employment effects of unemployment
benefits
The effect of the unemployment benefits on re-employment has been subject to a
number of studies during the past ten years. Below we survey a selective sample
of the Finnish studies.
Kettunen (1993) uses data from the Ministry of Labour by drawing a random
sample of 2077 unemployed from the flow into unemployment during 1985. He
finds that a higher replacement ratio lowers the exit hazard and that the effect is
larger for the non-members of the UI-funds. He also finds that there was a peak in
the hazard rates after 20 weeks of unemployment when unemployment benefits
were reduced by 20%. Another early study worth mentioning is by Lilja (1993).
She estimates competing risk models of exit from unemployment based on data
from Finnish Labour Force Surveys 1984–1987. She does not calculate the
replacement rates, but estimates the model separately for the recipients of
unemployment insurance (UI) and basic unemployment allowance (UA). The
hazard rate for the UI-recipients is twice as high as for the otherwise similar UA-
recipients. As the UI-recipients have generally much higher replacement rates this
suggests that other factors vary considerably across the two groups.
Holm, Kyyrä and Rantala (1999) attempt to improve the estimates by using
forward-looking measures of replacement rates. As unemployment periods are
often associated with significant wage decreases, the replacement rates based on
the previous earnings may overstate the gains from re-employment. They estimate
expected post-unemployment wages based on data on those who exit from
employment and show that the expected gain of employment increases
considerably the likelihood of employment.
                                                
2 According to the original Unemployment Security Act in 1984, the earnings-related
unemployment benefits were reduced by 20% after 100 days of unemployment. In 1987, the rule
was changed so that the benefits would be reduced by 12.5% after 200 days. In 1989, the
paragraph was abolished, and since then the earnings related benefits have been paid without a
reduction up to 500 days.18
A common problem in the existing Finnish studies is the lack of convincingly
exogenous variation in the replacement rates. The variation in the replacement
rates is driven by the variation in previous earnings, and is hence correlated with a
number of factors that may influence the re-employment probabilities.
Evidence on the effect of the duration of unemployment benefits is somewhat
more convincing. Rantala (2002) studies the effect of the change in the age limit
of the ‘unemployment pension tunnel’ in 1997. The change effectively reduced
the maximum benefit duration to 500 days for workers who were between 53 and
54 years old. Prior to the reform they could keep receiving unemployment
benefits up to the retirement age. According to Figure 7 – which shows the
‘transition rates’ to unemployment by age between 1995 and 1999 – the
unemployment risk increases considerably at the beginning of the unemployment
tunnel. Before the reform, the unemployment risk doubled from 3 to 6 percent
when the workers turned 53. After the reform the unemployment risk for the 53–
54 -year-olds was similar than for the younger workers. In 1997–1998, the
unemployment risk increases only after the workers turn 55, and meet the new age
criteria.
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There are important interactions between unemployment benefits and economic
shocks. Hakola and Uusitalo (2001) show that the incentives created by the
generous unemployment benefits for the older unemployed had little effect on the
unemployment rates before the recession. As seen in Figure 8, the unemployment
rates for the 55–59 -year-olds were close to the unemployment rates of the
younger groups up to the early 1990s. The generosity of benefits suddenly started
to matter during the recession. The unemployment rates of 55–59 -year-olds19
increased to over 20 percent, twice as high as for the younger age groups. Similar
interaction effects between shocks and institutions can be found also in micro
cross-section data. Using a linked worker-firm panel, Hakola and Uusitalo (2001)
show that the effect of the unemployment tunnel eligibility on displacement
probability is much larger when the firm faces a negative demand shock.
Extended unemployment benefits for the older workers are responsible for a
large share of aggregate unemployment. In 2000, one third of all registered
unemployed (including those on unemployment pension) were over 55. The effect
on long-term unemployment is even larger; in 2000, two thirds of long-term
unemployed were over 55.

































Source: Hakola & Uusitalo (2001)
A number of studies on the effect of the benefit duration focus on the hazard of
employment around the benefit exhaustion date. For example, Meyer (1990) and
Katz and Meyer (1990) note that, in the US, the probability of leaving
unemployment rises just prior to when the benefits elapse. Carling et al (1996)
find a similar but smaller effect using Swedish data. They also note that the exit
rates to various training programs rise dramatically around the time of the benefit
exhaustion.
To examine the question we constructed a data of all unemployment spells
experienced by 350  000 individuals drawn from the Employment Statistics of20
Statistics Finland.
3 We select all new entrants to unemployment between 1995 and
1998. Of the 104 358 unemployment spells, 57 percent ended in re-employment.
Some 30 percent of the unemployed entered training programs or subsidized jobs,
and 9 percent moved out of the labour force.
In Figure 9, we draw empirical hazard rates separately by the exit route,
treating other exits as censored observations. The top left corner includes exits to
all destinations, shows two clear spikes in the hazard rate. The first is at 360 days
and the second right after the maximum duration of the benefits at 500 days.
However, when we look only at the exits to the open employment, these spikes
disappear altogether! The hazard to the open employment shows negative duration
dependence, but no effects of the benefit exhaustion. There is no clear pattern in
the exits from the labour force. Finally, the lower right corner provides an
explanation for the spikes in the hazard. Most labour market programs are
targeted for the long-term unemployed who have been unemployed for over a
year. This shows as a big increase in the hazard at 360 days. Hazard of entering
the labour market programs also grows around the benefit expiration date.
                                                
3 Employment Statistics contain information from various registers and covers the entire Finnish
population. The information on unemployment spells is based on administrative data on the dates
when the unemployed were registered at the employment offices. In order to focus on the
unemployed who risk losing their benefits after 500 days, we restrict the sample to the
unemployed who are under 53 at the start of the unemployment spell, and who receive earnings-
related unemployment benefits. Information on the benefits is based on tax records and was
available for 1995–1998. We excluded some 10% of the spells because the reason of ending the
spell was unknown. The spells that did not end by the end of 1999 were treated as censored.21

























































4.3 Unions and wage formation
As in other Scandinavian countries, the union density is high in Finland. The
union density has increased rather steadily from the 1960’s to the early 1990’s.
Pehkonen and Tanninen (1997) report that the union density was 22% in 1960,
and has since then increased, reaching 82% in 1992. According to the Working
Life Barometer, the union density peaked at 86% in 1995 and has slightly
declined during the latter half of the 1990’s being 83% in 2001. One of the main
reasons for increased union density is the increase in unemployment. Under a
‘Gent-system’ the unemployment insurance is organized around UI-funds
administered by the unions and subsidized by the government. Membership is
voluntary and the increase in the unemployment risk encourages workers to seek
membership in the UI-funds. In most cases this is easiest to do by joining a union.
The wage bargains – containing an agreement on the general wage increase
applied to all wages – are negotiated at the industry-level between the worker and
the employer organizations. Collective agreements cover also non-union members
in the sectors where at least half of the employers belong to an employer
organization. In practice, this implies that 95 percent of the workers in Finland are
covered by the union contracts.
Most bargaining rounds have started with negotiations between
confederations of employer and employee unions, creating a high degree of co-22
ordination in the individual union contracts. The union bargains have then been
negotiated based on the wage increases agreed in the central agreement. There has
been considerable variation in the degree of centralization between the different
bargaining rounds. During the period 1969–2002, there have been seven
bargaining rounds (1973, 1980, 1983, 1988, 1994, 1995, and 2000) when no
central bargain was reached and bargaining occurred at the industry-level. Also
even in the years when a central bargain was reached, not all unions accepted it.
Co-ordination in the union bargaining may moderate wage increases by
internalising the cost of unemployment due to extensive wage increases. Calmfors
(2001) summarizes the results of recent studies, which indicate that
unemployment is lowest in countries where bargaining is most centralized. Given
the variation in the degree of centralization between the different bargaining
rounds, we can extend the previous analyses by examining the effects of the year-
to-year differences in bargaining regimes within a country. With our data it is
more natural to examine the effects of centralization on wage growth than on
unemployment, and we report these results below.
As shown in the Table 1, the average bargained wage increases have been 1.8
percentage points lower during the centralized bargaining rounds. If one looks at
the differences between centralized bargains with wide coverage (almost all
unions accepting the central agreement) and decentralized bargains the difference
is even greater, 4%. Controlling for the differences in unemployment and inflation
at the time of wage negotiations does not alter the picture. The difference between
central bargains and industry-level bargains is 3.3% and the difference between
centralized bargains with wide coverage and decentralized bargains is 4.1%.
Wage drift, ie average wage growth that exceeds the bargained wage
increases, may offset the wage moderating effects of centralized bargaining.
According to figures in the rightmost column of Table 1, this has not been the
case in Finland. On average, the nominal wage increases have exceeded the
bargained wage increases by 4 percentage points, but the differences in nominal
wage increases between the centralized and the industry-level bargains are
approximately as large as the differences in the bargained wage increases.23
Table 4.1 Nominal wage increases by the level of wage
bargaining






Decentralized bargaining 7 6.5 10.1
Centralized bargaining (all) 27 4.7 8.9
Degree of centralization
   No coverage (decentralized) 7 6.5 10.1
   Low coverage 3 8.4 13.3
   Medium coverage 10 6.6 12.0









Decentralized bargaining 7 7.7 12.2
Centralized bargaining (all) 27 4.4 8.1
Degree of centralization
   No coverage (decentralized) 7 7.3 11.8
   Low coverage 3 7.1 10.6
   Medium coverage 10 5.5 9.5
   Wide coverage 14 3.2 6.7
The numbers in the lower section of the table are based on a regression model of
bargained wage increase (and nominal wage growth) on lagged unemployment
and inflation rates and the dummies for the different bargaining regimes.
Estimation period is 1969–2002 for the bargained wage increases and 1969–2000
for the nominal wage growth. Data on the degree of centralization, the bargained
wage increases and the nominal wage growth are from Marjanen (2002).
Unemployment and inflation rates are from Labour Force Survey and Consumer
Price Index of Statistics Finland. In all estimated equations unemployment had a
significant negative effect on both the bargained and the actual wage increases.
The dummy variables for different bargaining regimes were highly significant in
all estimated equations.
To conclude, the results using Finnish data lie in conformity with findings from
cross-country data. The centralized bargaining moderates wage increases and,
thereby, will decrease the equilibrium unemployment. Prime examples from the
1990’s include national bargains in the recession years 1992 and 1993 when the
wages were not increased at all. On the other hand, different rates of economic
recoveries across industries lead to industry-level bargaining and somewhat
higher wage increases in 1994 and 1995.24
4.4 Active labour market policies
Figure 10 shows how the size of the active labour market programs has evolved
during the past twenty years. In the 1980’s the vast majority of programs were
placements to subsidized jobs in the public sector. In the 1990’s, the share of
labour market training has increased. The total number of individuals in the
different programs was highest in 1997 when more than 100 000 persons or more
than 4% of the labour force were placed in active labour market programs. Simply
adding the individuals in programs to open unemployment would increase the
unemployment rate by 4%, but the calculation is not quite as simple because that
some of these individuals are already classified as unemployed in the Labour
Force Surveys.





















































In labor market training
Source: Finnish Labour Review 1/2002
Most empirical Finnish studies on the effects of ALMPs have concentrated in
estimating the employment effects of different programs using micro-level data.
The results indicate that participation in training programs have, in general,
improved labour market prospects. Hämäläinen (1999) finds that training
programs have been beneficial for 80–90 percent of the participants, and Tuomala
(2002) reports that labour market training has increased post-program
employment probability and shortened the duration of unemployment. The results
on the subsidized job programs are less encouraging. Tuomala (2002) finds that
program participation has even reduced the probability of finding a job from open
labour markets. Also Hämäläinen reports that subsidized jobs have been less
effective than other labour market programs, but notes that placements to the25
private sector improve labour market opportunities more than placements to the
public sector.
5 On the duration of unemployment
For most of the 1980s, long-term unemployment was not much of the problem in
Finland. Average duration of ongoing unemployment spells was around 25 weeks,
and the proportion of the long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than a
year) slightly over 10 percent. This was partly due to favourable employment
situation and partly to legislation enacted in 1987 (abolished in 1992) that
required employment offices to place long-term unemployed to subsidised jobs.
During the recession in the early 1990s this favourable picture changed
completely. First, the average duration declined and the fraction of the long-term
unemployed fell to 3 percent. Then the fraction of the long-term unemployed
grew together with the unemployment rate until 1995. By then almost a third of
the unemployed were classified as long-term unemployed. Long-term
unemployment remained high also after 1995 even though the unemployment rate
was declining. The average duration of the ongoing unemployment spells has
been approximately 52 weeks since 1995.
Long-term unemployment displays anti-clockwise loops and lags behind the
unemployment rate. As shown by Machin and Manning (1999), a similar picture
appears also in a number of other European countries. Variation in the inflow
rates is partly responsible for the observed loops. It is also possible that the
outflow rates for the long-term unemployed falls more in the recession, as the
employers have a larger pool of unemployed to choose from. In the ranking model
by Blanchard and Diamond (1994), employers always choose to hire the workers
with the shortest unemployment duration. The ranking model therefore implies
that the duration dependence increases during the recession.26















































Source: Finnish Labour Review 1/2002
To look at the issues more closely, we performed some empirical calculations
using administrative data from the unemployment offices. We used the same
sample of as in the previous chapter containing all recorded unemployment spells
experienced by 350  000 individuals, drawn randomly from the Employment
Statistics. We collected information on the dates of entry into unemployment and
exit out of unemployment for the period 1987–1999. After deleting some
individuals with missing dates we were left with 664 000 unemployment spells.
Given the long panel, we can examine the changes in the re-employment hazard
and duration dependence over the whole business cycle.
First, in Table 2, we calculate the exit rates from unemployment to the active
labour market programs, open employment, and out of the labour force. We find
that only less than half of the unemployment spells end by an exit to open
employment. The fraction of exits to open employment varies across the cycle,
and account for only a quarter of exits during the worst years of recession.
Opposite cyclical movements can be observed in the exits to the active labour
market programs and out of the labour force. A high fraction of the unknown
destinations, particularly in the early 1990s may have an effect on these estimates.27
Table 2. Reason of ending unemployment
Reason %
Year ALP Employed Out of LF Recall Unknown Total
1987 5.32 60.58 9.55 1.93 22.62 28 383
1988 4.54 57.42 8.04 8.28 21.73 29 838
1989 4.44 57.43 8.44 8.12 21.56 28 194
19990 8.80 41.76 9.04 7.72 32.69 31 192
1991 15.05 24.89 12.97 3.09 44.01 57 309
1992 18.57 24.25 16.12 4.32 36.74 66 016
1993 24.35 23.47 15.96 9.12 27.11 67 613
1994 27.12 37.73 16.31 5.33 13.51 64 585
1995 28.63 38.55 15.50 4.69 12.63 64 395
1996 28.69 39.27 13.81 4.46 13.77 66 027
1997 27.88 40.38 12.71 4.51 14.52 57 162
1998 25.97 42.48 11.14 4.77 15.64 53 554
1999 21.26 45.66 10.26 6.49 16.33 49 094
Total 21.13 37.77 13.23 5.44 22.43 664 082
Below, we focus on the exits to the open employment (including recalls from a
lay-off) and treat all other exits as censored observations. In Table 3 we report
results from fitting a simple parametric Weibull-model to the duration data. In the
first column we include no covariates except the year dummies (entry year). The
results are reported as hazard ratios restricting the year 1990 to one.
The estimation results show that hazard rates are clearly counter-cyclical.
During the boom in the late 1980s the employment hazards were about 50 percent
higher than in 1990. In contrast, during the recession, 1992–1993, the hazard was
only third of the 1990 level. Towards the end of the 1990s, the hazard rates have
been increasing, but are still below the pre-recession level. The duration
dependence is documented by the Weibull-coefficient ‘p’ at the bottom of the
table. For the exponential model with constant hazard the p is equal to one. Value
0.67 shows strong negative duration dependence. Probability of exit decreases
rapidly with the spell duration.28
Table 3. Duration model for employment hazards
(1) (2) (3)
Year (base 1990)
1987 1.160 1.143 0.952
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.017)**
1988 1.434 1.424 1.313
(0.016)** (0.016)** (0.023)**
1989 1.570 1.587 1.523
(0.018)** (0.018)** (0.027)**
1991 0.426 0.415 0.291
(0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)**
1992 0.343 0.331 0.214
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)**
1993 0.389 0.374 0.239
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.005)**
1994 0.556 0.531 0.402
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)**
1995 0.594 0.567 0.438
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.008)**
1996 0.639 0.616 0.484
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.009)**
1997 0.693 0.674 0.546
(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.009)**
1998 0.746 0.697 0.554
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)**
























Local unemployment rate 0.999 0.999
(0.000)** (0.001)*
Observations 664082 663692 663692
P 0.67 0.70 0.94
Frailty 1.61
Reported coefficients are hazard ratios. Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level29
The changes in the hazard rates over the cycle could be explained by the
compositional effects. If groups that typically can expect relatively longer
durations enter unemployment in proportionally greater numbers during the
recession, the aggregate average duration will display countercyclical variation.
We examine the composition effects in column 2 of table 3. We add covariates
measuring age, education and sex to the duration model. To capture the regional
differences, we include a measure of the regional unemployment rate. We also
add an indicator on whether an unemployed has been classified mentally or
physically disabled by the employment offices. These additional covariates have a
large impact on the hazard rates. As expected, the hazard rates increase with
education and decrease with age. Females have a slightly higher hazard, and a
higher regional unemployment lowers the hazard rates. Having been classified as
disabled almost halves the re-employment hazard. However, adding all these
covariates has little effect on the time pattern of the hazard rates. Hence,
according to estimation results, the changes in the hazard rates over the cycle are
not driven by the composition of the unemployed.
In the third column, we generalize the model to allow for unobserved
heterogeneity. We make a standard assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity
is multiplicative, and follows a Gamma distribution. The main impact of allowing
for the unobserved heterogeneity is that our estimate of duration dependence
declines. We also estimated the model allowing the duration dependence differ
across the years (not reported in the table). The results were quite interesting.
Negative duration dependence was strongest in the years 1992–1994, when the
expected durations (and the unemployment rates) were at their highest level. The
results are consistent with the ranking model by Blanchard and Diamond (1994).
6 Conclusions
What are the lessons that could be drawn based on the Finnish unemployment
experience during the past twenty years? First one might observe that, in 2003, the
Finnish unemployment rates are rather close to the European average both in
terms of the level and the duration. An interesting question is why the
unemployment rate remained so low until the late 1980s. An obvious candidate
for the explanation is that the Finnish economy experienced much smaller shocks
than the countries in the continental Europe.
During the 1980s, the Finnish economy was relatively isolated from the rest
of the Europe. In the absence of free international capital movements the central
bank could set the interest rates freely, and the devaluations of the Finnish markka
could be used to adjust the price level to maintain the competitiveness of the
export sector. Bilateral trade with the former Soviet Union contributed to the30
stability. According to the bilateral trade agreements, an increase in oil prices led
automatically to an increase in the export demand. Therefore, trade with the
Soviet Union effectively isolated Finland from the oil price shocks that are often
at least partly blamed for the increased unemployment in Europe in the 1970s.
The liberalization of the financial markets in the end of the 1980s and the end of
the bilateral trade agreements opened the Finnish economy to the outside shocks.
The incomplete design of financial market deregulation associated with the fixed
exchange rate target of the Finnish markka led to large indebtedness of the private
sector both domestically and partly in foreign currency terms. High real interest
rate and depreciation of the Finnish markka were large adverse shocks to the
highly indebted private sector.
While the economic shocks provide a sufficient explanation to the rapid
increase in the unemployment in the early 1990’s, it is difficult to argue that these
shocks explain the persistency of unemployment during the strong recovery
period in the later part of 1990’s.
If not the shocks, maybe the institutions should bare the blame. However, the
labour market institutions today are not much different than in the 1980s. The
main features of the unemployment insurance system are unchanged. The union
density has increased but the union coverage has remained roughly constant. The
main features of the wage bargaining system are also unchanged. The changes in
the tax system and in the active labour market policies should probably be seen as
the consequences and not as the causes for the development. Also empirically
their effects on employment appear to have been relatively small. These
institutions did not create high unemployment rates in the 1980s. Nickell (1999)
calculates the change in the equilibrium unemployment rate from 1980s to 1990s
in Finland based on the coefficients from cross-country regressions of
unemployment on institutional features. He concludes that the changes in the
institutions only explain the rise in equilibrium unemployment from 5.7 to 6.1
percent.
However, no major shocks hit the economy until the early 1990s. The
institutional rigidities started to matter only after major shocks. Interactions
between shocks and institutions a’la Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) might provide
a better explanation for persistent unemployment. The easiest example is the
unemployment tunnel, guaranteeing elderly unemployed benefits until retirement.
The policy was introduced when the unemployment rates were low, and long-term
unemployment rare. The extended benefits did not appear to have much effect
then. Only when the recession created a need to cut the workforce, the benefits for
the older started to matter, increasing the incidence and duration of
unemployment.31
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